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NOTES AND COMMENT
In Troidle v. Adirondack P. & L. Corporation 10 the plaintiff, in
order to erect a radio aerial wire, threw one end over the defendant's
wires, twenty feet above the ground, carrying a heavy voltage of
electricity. As the aerial came into contact with defendant's wires,
that part which remained on the ground uncoiled and struck plaintiff,
causing a current of electricity to pass through his body and to injure
him. The defendant was held to have owed no duty to the plaintiff
so to insulate his wires that in a perilous situation of plaintiff's own
creation, in which he voluntarily placed himself, he might suffer no
harm. Five judges concurred; Cardozo, Ch. J., concurred in result
on the ground that the defendant was not proved to have been negli-
gent in that the insulation was not shown to be inadequate in view of
the contingencies reasonably to be foreseen.
And finally in the very recent case of Van Leet v. Kilmer 1 the
plaintiff's intestate, while standing upon a ladder placed against a
building, was fishing for a baffle plate inside a blower with an iron
rod. This rod came into contact with the defendant's low voltage
wires strung along the side of the building, shocking the deceased,
causing him to fall, from which he sustained a fractured skull and
died. The plaintiff was denied recovery since the defendant was not
bound to foresee and to make provision against such an accident.
So it will be seen that no liability for the creation of a dangerous
situation exists where it could not reasonably be foreseen that in the
ordinary course of events such situation would be fraught with danger
to anyone rightfully and customarily in the vicinity. Liability does
arise when there is a failure to provide the necessary safeguards
where the danger is reasonably to be anticipated.
HARRY BAUER SAM ES.
RIGHTS OF PARTIES TO A SUBORDINATION AGREEMENT.
The recent decision of the Court of Appeals in the case of the
Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Fairfield Gardens, Inc.," reversing the de-
cision of the Appellate Division 2 has again caused much discussion
among attorneys concerning the policy of the Courts and the Legis-
lature concerning building loan mortgages, the rights of prior and
subsequent lienors, and the rights of mortgagees who subordinate
their liens to such a building loan mortgage.
The ruling of the Court in the instant case is, that where a
mortgagee, at the instance of the owner of the property, agrees to
1oTroidle v. Adirondack P. & L. Co., supra note 6.
"Supra note 3.
1260 N. Y. 16, 182 N. E. 231 (1932).
2235 App. Div. 768, 256 N. Y. Supp. 719 (1st Dept. 1932).
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subordinate his lien to a building loan mortgage to be executed
between said owner and a lender, even though the subordination
runs directly to the lender, there is no duty owing by such a lender
to a party so subordinating his lien beyond making the advances
called for in the building loan mortgage. Upon a cursory glance
the decision seems to be in accord with the apparent intention of
the parties, but upon closer examination the result of this decision
may well be questioned in the light of other rulings by this same
Court, as well as in the light of the practical result whereby a very
valuable first lien is eliminated by a second mortgagee without the
real purpose and intent of the maker of the subordination agree-
ment being observed. The net practical result, if this decision is
not limited, will be to place an effective barrier before owners of
real property subject to encumbrances who wish to improve said
property and cannot arrange a building loan mortgage which will
permit them to pay off prior encumbrances, for under this decision
no mortgagee would dare subordinate his lien unless he received
a covenant to build from the mortgage company, which covenant
could not be obtained for no mortgage company will assume such
an onerous duty.
Under a prior decision this Court took judicial notice "that
it is the ordinary and usual course when a party agrees to make
a building loan on real estate that existing encumbrances whether
mortgages, taxes, assessments * * * are paid out of the new loan
as far as practical and the Court will take judicial notice thereof." 3
The Lien Law 4 defines cost of improvement to include in its
meaning of said term expenditures incurred by the owner to dis-
charge mortgages and other encumbrances existing prior to the time
when the lien provided for in this chapter (building loan lien) may
attach.
Thus we have a course of dealing in building loan mortgages
recognized first by the courts and then by the legislature. When
this recognized system is varied by contract, the written instrument,
if the source of conflicting claims by disputants, should be closely
scrutinized so as to arrive at true intent of the parties. This a
Court of Equity has power to do.5
The major question herein, as well as in similar cases is, and
will be, does the lender owe any duty to a subordinating party be-
yond the mere advancing of the money under the mortgage. It
may be noted here that the Lien Law 1 expressly frees the lender
' Penn Steel v. T. G. T., 193 N. Y. 37, 85 N. E. 820 (1908).
IN. Y. LIEN LAW, art. 1, §2, added by L. 1929, c. 515, §1, amended by
L. 1930, c. 859, §1.
'Smith v. Cross, 90 N. Y. 549 (1882); Zeiser v. Cohen, 207 N. Y. 407,
101 N. E. 184 (1913); People ex rel. Brachist v. Kaiser, 209 App. Div. 722,
205 N. Y. Supp. 317 (3rd Dept. 1924) ; Silverstein v. Taubenkimmel, 209 App.
Div. 710, 205 N. Y. Supp. 241 (3rd Dept. 1924).
IN. Y. LIEN LAW §13, subd. 3, as amended by L. 1929, L. 1930, L. 1932.
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from any duty as to the proper application of the funds advanced,
but this merely applies as between lender and lienors under the
owner and contractor and not to disputes under subordination
agreements.
The familiar maxim "Equity will look through the mere form
of a transaction to the substance and determine the equities" 7 will
permit us to determine what was the real intention of the subordina-
tion agreement, and since "that the motive and intent with which
an act is done may and often is ascertained and determined by in-
ferences drawn from proof of facts and circumstances connected
with the transaction and the parties to it" 8 that the intention and
purpose of the first mortgagee hereinafter called the defendant, was
to subordinate his lien to a mortgage of $700,000 00,9 to be used
for the erection of a particular building as per certain specifications
known to both parties 10 and that he had a right to rely on the good
faith of the mortgage company hereinafter called the plaintiff in
insisting on strict compliance by the borrower with all the terms
of the building loan mortgage so that an adequate security for both
the building loan mortgage and the now subordinate first mortgage
would arise. This is so because the plaintiff knew that the defen-
dant had no right, nor could in any way control the erection of the
said building. The plaintiff may be deemed to have understood and
known that the first mortgagee was only subordinating on condition
that $700,000.00 be advanced to erect a certain type of building,
for anything else would not meet the purpose of the subordination.
Any change in either would result in a failure of consideration.
This is a normal inference to be drawn from the surrounding
facts, nature, and type of subordination agreement executed by the
first mortgagee, for a man ordinarily does not surrender a very
valuable superior lien without some assurance of protection by the
person receiving the benefits thereby, and if same is not expressly
stated, it may be implied." In short, the Court may, and should,
rule that this agreement was in the nature of a unilateral contract
offered by the defendant to the plaintiff and as such requiring an
unequivocal acceptance. 1 2 The plaintiff denies such and claims that
if it is an offer, it goes to the owner, but the facts repudiate such
a claim. The subordination on its face describes the defendant as
party of the first part, and the plaintiff as party of the second part.1
3
'Supra note 5.
-Hennequin v. Naylor, 24 N. Y. 139 (1861); Adams v. Gillig, 199 N. Y.
314, 92 N. E. 670 (1910).
'Supra note 1, at 20.
1oSupra note 1, at 23.
Supra note 8, 2 Bisiaop, CONTRACTS (1907) §241.
, Stanley v. Gannon, 109 Misc. 611, 180 N. Y. Supp. 602 (1919) ; 17 West
50th St. Corp. v. Tollerton, 107 Misc. 609, 177 N. Y. Supp. 89 (1919).
" Supra note 1, at 20.
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The mere fact that plaintiff did not sign such agreement is imma-
terial.
What is important is that it accepted such offer by entering
into the agreement by advancing money thereunder. An agreement
subordinating a prior mortgage to a junior mortgage lien runs to
the holder of the junior mortgage. 14 The Court, in its own opinion,";
states, that if the holder of the mortgage subordinated by agreement
to the plaintiff's mortgage has any defense, it must be because by
language of the agreement or through the relation created thereby,
some duty to protect the interest of the holder of the subordinated
mortgage was placed upon the lender. The mortgage company hav-
ing accepted the full benefit of the subordination in the nature of
a unilateral contract and well knowing, by inference at least, that
the intention of the holder of the first mortgage was to subordinate
to a mortgage, the proceeds of which were to be used to build a
certain specified type of building essential to accomplish the desired
improvement as per the terms of the building loan mortgage, could
such a lender by virtue of a general waiver clause aimed not at this
defendant, because there was nothing left for this defendant to do,
but rather towards the breaches by the owner, deny any liability or
duty to report to the first mortgage holder any material change in
the plans, the result of which was to end in the construction of a
different type of building than was intended, and perhaps defeat
or endanger the security of the holder of the first mortgage. The
Trial Court found as a fact that the garages were an essential part
of the building, and necessary to the type of building contem-
plated. Even the type, size, and number of garages were spe-
cified in the building loan mortgage. A failure to perform an essen-
tial part of the contract goes to the heart of the agreement and
results in a failure of consideration, for the changed building did
not secure the improvement intended and thus defeated the purpose
and consideration of the subordination.
The Court in Lewis v. Gollner'0 said, "to warrant relief in
case of an infraction of an agreement, it is not essential that said
agreement be binding at law, or any privity of estate or contract
exist between the parties". Even if plaintiff's plea of no privity of
contract be upheld, the above rule may well apply to prevent a fraud
inasmuch as the plaintiff had actual notice of this defendant's in-
tention and purpose to subordinate to a building loan mortgage con-
templating a certain specific type of building, costing a certain set
stun, since the subordination arose actually out of the demand by
the plaintiff for a first lien for its mortgage, when it knew of this
defendant's existing first lien.
-"Londoner v. Perlman, 129 App. Div. 93, 113 N. Y. Supp. 420 (lst Dept.
1908) ; Rose v. Provident Loan Society, 28 Ind. App. 25, 62 N. E. 293 (1901) ;
Leibers v. Plainfield Spanish Homes, 108 N. J. Eq. 391, 155 Att. 270 (1931).
" Supra note 1, at 22.
" 129 N. Y. 227, 29 N. E. 81 (1891).
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And to show plaintiff's bad -faith and a complete failure of
consideration for the contract, it must be borne out that this plain-
tiff well knew in advance or is deemed to know, since ignorance of
the law is no excuse, that such a building as contemplated could
not be constructed because it was in violation of the Zoning Law
in force, which prohibited the construction of garages in that area.
Even conceding the plaintiff's plea of ignorance, for the time being,
the plaintiff did receive actual notice, and so admits, sometime in
April of 1929, after having advanced the sum of $275,000.00. Can
the plaintiff now be heard to claim protection of no duty owing to
this defendant in order to protect the advances thereafter made
when it actually knew that any advances thereafter made would go
into the construction of a building not at all in the contemplation
of the security desired by this defendant in return for its subordina-
tion. It may be noted here that this building was subsequently sold
under foreclosure for $600,000.00 and at most this plaintiff could
claim protection only for the advances of $275,000.00. In the opin-
ion of the writer, the contract of subordination was void 17 inasmuch
as the purpose was to accomplish an illegal act, namely to erect a
prohibited type of building within a restricted area. Can the plain-
tiff now be heard to claim the rights of a contract which it is deemed
to know to have been illegal 18 or can it disregard the illegal part
and claim the benefits of the legal part.
The plaintiff took an unfair advantage of this defendant inas-
much as by virtue of its own form of subordination it caused the
defendant to rely on an implied promise to perform as per the build-
ing loan agreement. It is well known that mortgage companies
always use their own legal forms and it is fair to presume that such
is the case herein. And the defendant had a right to rely upon the
presumption that the plaintiff would not take an unfair advantage
over him, in view of the nature of the transaction, the full knowl-
edge of the plaintiff, and the fact that no present consideration
passed to the defendant. While Equity will not relieve a party from
loss due to mistake of law, it will analyze with care any evidence
that may indicate an unfair advantage taken of one seeking relief.' 9
The obligation of good faith, which is an implied condition in every
contract, required plaintiff not to exercise its right to the detriment
of the defendant without notice. It should not have modified the
building plans so as to imperil the contemplated security of the
1, Sage v. Hampe, 235 U. S. 99, 35 Sup. Ct. 94 (1914); Mills Novelty
Co. v. Dupouy, 203 Fed. 254 (C. C. A. 7th, 1913); Cleveland Ry. v. Hirsh,
204 Fed. 849 (C. C. A. 6th, 1913).
1 Sternaman v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 170 N. Y. 13, 62 N. F. 763 (1902);
Coverley v. Terminal Warehouse Company, 82 App. Div. 488, aff'd, 178 N. Y.
602, 70 N. E. 1097 (1904) ; Hart v. City Theatre Co., 250 N. Y. 322, 109 N. E.
497 (1915); Kloberg v. Teller, 103 Misc.-641, 171 N. Y. Supp. 947 (1918);
Atterbridge v. Pennbroke, 235 App. Div. 101, 256 N. Y. Supp. 257 (4th Dept.
1932).
"Ryan v. John Wanamaker, 116 Misc. 91, 190 N. Y. Supp. 250 (1921).
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defendant, in reliance upon which (and of which conduct the plain-
tiff did know) it subordinated.
So we may well imply a duty on the part of the plaintiff to
notify the defendant of a change in plans in the mortgage to which
the defendant subordinated his lien, since a change in plans meant
a change in the security impliedly demanded by this defendant for
his subordination. The plaintiff could not of its own will or no-
tion alter or change the terms of the contract, which included in
its entirety the subordination and the building loan mortgage, and
all the terms of the latter, including the plans.
If there was any doubt as to the rights and liabilities of the
parties, the duty was on the mortgage company to show that there
was no fraud. "He who benefits by a contract or a transaction has
the burden of showing the integrity and fairness of the transaction,
that it was fully understood, and that there was no fraud or mis-
take." 20 The defendant herein secured no return for his act, and
he surrendered a first lien in contemplation of the construction of
a certain specified improvement which would be an adequate se-
curity for the building loan mortgage and his now subordinated lien.
The plaintiff practiced a fraud on the defendant in that it failed
to perform a duty owing to saia defendant. Constructive fraud
consists of an act or omission which is contrary to legal or equitable
duty, or trust or confidence justly reposed, and which is contrary
to good conscience, and operates to the injury of another.2 1
The plaintiff seeks equity with unclean hands in that he violated
a duty justly owing to this defendant in failing to notify him of the
change in an essential part of the plans and hence should be denied
the relief sought for herein.
Equity will not aid in bringing about inequitable results, and
he who seeks equity must do equity, 22 and further, Equity will not
assist those who by indirection violate their agreements * * * 23
Here the plaintiff, having violated a duty owing to the defendant,
resulting in a failure of consideration and thus restoring his first
lien seeks to accomplish a grave injustice on this defendant by elim-
inating said lien through a foreclosure of plaintiff's junior mortgage
due to a default by the borrower.
Still more, Equity will not permit a party having a legal right,
to avail himself of it for purposes of injustice or oppression.2 4
Here plaintiff had a right to waive a breach of the building loan
mortgage by the borrower. As to this waiver clause, the parties
Barnard v. Gantz, 140 N. Y. 249, 35 N. E. 430 (1893); Ten Eyck v.
Whitbeck, 156 N. Y. 341, 50 N. E. 963 (1898); Allen v. La Vaud, 213 N. Y.
322, 107 N. E. 570 (1915).
2-In re Dority's Will, 118 Misc. 725, 194 N. Y. Supp. 573 (1922).
-2Johnson-Kahn v. Thompson, 73 Misc. 103, 130 N. Y. Supp. 216 (1911).
'McGrath v. Normer, 221 App. Div. 804, 223 N. Y. Supp. 288 (2d Dept.
1927).
-'Lougherty v. Catalona, 207 App. Div. 895, 201 N. Y. Supp. 919 (1st
Dept. 1923).
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never intended this to apply to this defendant who could commit no
breach inasmuch as there was nothing left for him to do, but rather
was intended to apply to the borrower who had many obligations
resting on him under the contract. This is all right as between
those parties but where such waiver is taken advantage of to secure
an unfair position over, or to defeat the purpose of, this defendant,
who could in no way interfere with or govern the performance of
the building contract, and cause a great loss to him, such is inequi-
table and ought not to be permitted.
Since the question in a Court of Equity is not what the Court
must do, but rather what the Court ought to do, in view of all the
circumstances in each case, in order to further justice and prevent
oppression,25 it certainly is not the doctrine of a Court of Equity
to enforce by its peculiar mandate, every contract in all cases, even
where a specific execution is found to be its legal intention and
effect. A Court of Equity gives or withholds such decree accord-
ing to its discretion, in view of the circumstances of the case, and
the plaintiff's prayer for relief is not answered, when under the
circumstances the relief he seeks would be inequitable. 26
Therefore defendant's subordination agreement should be can-
celled and his lien declared a valid first lien, or, at most, subject only
to a first lien of $275,000 00, as above mentioned.
This discussion would be further justified in view of the dan-
gerous situation likely to be incurred under the apparent policy of
protecting the investments and contracts of building loan mortgage
companies, and which may occur in similar cases in the future
where a holder of a first lien is asked to subordinate his lien to a
building loan mortgage. He could have no protection against a
breach by an owner, or any act of such a mortgage company ad-
vancing such a loan, save an indemnity bond or completion bond
which would be next to impossible to get in view of the freedom
of a waiver clause as is interpreted under this decision. And cer-
tainly no insurance company will issue an indemnity bond or com-
pletion bond to such a subordinating mortgagee who, in order to
subordinate, would have to subordinate to all the terms of a build-
ing loan mortgage.
It may be noted here in passing, as a matter of information,
that one direct result of this case has been to cause one large title
company in this state to relax its strict scrutiny and inspection of
construction jobs under their building loan mortgages, taking the
view that so long as they are satisfied as to how the construction
plans are being followed, they need not worry as to any claims
of any other interested parties.
Fish v. Lesser, 69 I1. 394 (1874) ; Plummer v. Keppler, 26 N. J. Eq. 481(1875).
1 Mathews v. Terwilliger, 3 Barb. 51 (N. Y. 1848); Peters v. Delaplaine,
49 N4. Y. 362 (1872); Margraf v. Muir, 57 N. Y. 155 (1874); Trustees v.
Thatcher, 87 N. Y. 311 (1882).
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Thus we can see as an apparent result of the above discussed
decisions and the Lien Law mentioned by section, that if an owner
desires to improve property that has a large lien on it, or such a
lien that a mortgage company refuses to consolidate with its first
lien, unless he can get a subordination to such a building loan mort-
gage, which in the light of this decision, he will not get, then the
property will have to stay as it is, unimproved-thus achieving the
very thing that the brief of the arnicus curiae in the instant case
feared, but not from his point of view, that of danger to a title
or mortgage company investment, but rather from the viewpoint
of the holder of a first lien who wants to aid in improving the
property but fears the results of this case.
A subordination agreement is nothing more than a contract be-
tween the party giving and the party receiving, and the ordinary,
well established rules of contract should apply where a court of
equity is called upon to determine the issues raised between con-
testing parties.
SAMUEL A. LOCKER.
THE CONVERSION OF STOCK.
In a recent New York case 1 the plaintiff was awarded damages
to the full extent of the value of the stock for the conversion of an
unindorsed certificate. The case presents problems which are funda-
mental both in the law of conversion and in the law of corporate
stock.
By disregarding the doctrine: "In order that conversion of a cer-
tificate of stock may constitute a conversion of the stock, which it
represents, the owner must be thereby deprived of the stock, and not
merely of the certificate ;" 2 the Court of Appeals has ignored prec-
edent set in several other states.3 These irreconcilable decisions are
based on the theory that acquisition of use and title by the converter
is the test of conversion, and the rule that a certificate of stock is not
the stock or share itself, but mere evidence of the holder's rights as a
stockholder. 4 The latter is a logical deduction from the former
unsound premise.
The natural meaning of converting property to one's own use
has long since been left behind. Conversion, in the modern view,
manifests itself in the exercise of unlawful dominion over the plain-
Pierpoint v. Hoyt, 260 N. Y. 26, 182 N. E. 235 (1932).
'11 FLE rCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATION LAW (1932) §5114.
'Daggett v. Davis, 53 Mich. 35, 18 N. W. 548 (1884); Pardee v. Nelson,
59 Utah 497, 205 Pac. 332 (1922).
' Ibid.
